Research

Imposter Syndrome

Imposter syndrome (also called the imposter phenomenon) describes a pattern in which highly successful people believe they are less intelligent and capable than their peers, and live in fear of being exposed. In these papers, I develop and defend a theory of imposter syndrome as a form of motivated cognition. I argue that individuals who experience imposter syndrome are, in at least some cases, biased toward negative self-beliefs because those beliefs motivate effort. The theoretical component of the project develops this account and explores its implications; the empirical component draws on paradigms from the motivated cognition literature to test its predictions.

  • Gadsby, S., & Hohwy, J. (2024) Negative performance evaluation in the imposter phenomenon. Current Psychology. 43, 9300–9308. (Published | Preprint)

  • Gadsby, S., & Hohwy, J. (2023). Incentivising accuracy reduces bias in the imposter phenomenon. Current Psychology, 42(32), 27865-27873. (Published | Preprint)

  • Gadsby, S. (2022). Imposter syndrome and self-deception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 100(2), 247-261. (Published | Final Draft)

Eating Disorders and Misbeliefs

In these papers, I examine why some people with eating disorders (anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa) hold false beliefs about their own body size—why they believe they are overweight when, in fact, they are dangerously thin. I argue that such beliefs are caused by misleading experiences of body size, which stem from distorted body representations (see the 'Body Representation' project). I am also interested in the implications of this account for the rationality of eating disorders.

  • Gadsby, S. (2024). Delusions in anorexia nervosa. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion, ed. E. Sullivan-Bissett. Routledge. (Final Draft)

  • Gadsby, S. (2024). Anorexia nervosa, body dissatisfaction, and problematic beliefs. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 15, 685–704. (Published | Final Draft)

  • Gadsby, S. (2023). The rationality of eating disorders. Mind & Language, 38(3), 732-749. (Open Access | Blog Post)

  • Gadsby, S., & Hohwy, J. (2020). Why use predictive processing to explain psychopathology? The case of anorexia nervosa. The Philosophy and Science of Predictive Processing, eds. S. Gouveia, R. Mendonça, & M. Curado. Bloomsbury. (Final Draft)

  • Gadsby, S. (2020). Self-deception and the second factor: How desire causes delusion in anorexia nervosa. Erkenntnis, 85(3), 609-626. (Published | Final Draft)

  • Gadsby, S. (2019). Manipulating body representations with virtual reality: clinical implications for anorexia nervosa. Philosophical Psychology, 32:6, 898-922. (Published | Final Draft)

  • Gadsby, S. (2017). Explaining body size beliefs in anorexia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 22(6), 495-507. (Published | Final Draft)

  • Gadsby, S. (2017). Anorexia nervosa and oversized experiences. Philosophical Psychology, 30, 594-615. (Published | Final Draft)

Measuring Misperception in Eating Disorders

In these papers, I document the methodological challenges involved in measuring self-misperception in eating disorders and develop novel experimental paradigms to address them.

  • Gadsby, S., Zopf, R., Brooks, K., Schumann, A., de la Cruz, F., Rieger, K., Murr, J., Wutzler, U., & Bär, K. (2023). Testing visual self-misperception in anorexia nervosa using a symmetrical body size estimation paradigm. International Journal of Eating Disorders. 56(11), 2149-2154. (Published | Preprint)

  • Engel, M., Gadsby, S., Corcoran, A., Keizer, A., Dijkerman, C., Hohwy, J. (2022) Waiting longer, feeling fatter: Effects of response delay on tactile distance estimation and confidence in anorexia nervosa. Brain and Behavior, 12(3), e2422. (Open Access)

  • Gadsby, S. (2021). Visual self-misperception in eating disorders. Perception, 50(11), 933-949. (Published | Final Draft)

‘Irrational’ Belief

Beyond eating disorders and the impostor syndrome, I am interested in beliefs more generally, particularly those that appear irrational. To that end, I work on issues related to the explanation and classification of delusional, conspiracist, and otherwise biased beliefs.

  • Gadsby, S. (2024). Motivational pessimism and motivated cognition. Synthese. 203, 119, 1-18. (Published | Final Draft)

  • van de Cruys, S., Bervoets, J., Gadsby, S., Gijbels, D., & Poels, K. (2023). Insight in the conspiracist’s mind. Personality and Social Psychology Review. 28(3), 302-324. (Open Access)

  • Gadsby, S. (2023). Bad beliefs: automaticity, arationality, and intervention. Philosophical Psychology, 36(4), 778-791. (Published | Final Draft)

  • Tappin, B., & Gadsby, S. (2019). Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: a deeper look at the evidence. Consciousness and Cognition, 65, 107-114. (Published | Final Draft)

  • Clutton, P., & Gadsby, S. (2018). Delusions, harmful dysfunctions, and treatable conditions. Neuroethics, 11(2), 167-181. (Published | Final Draft)

  • Clutton, P., Gadsby, S., & Klein, C. (2017). Taxonomising delusions: content or aetiology?. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 22(6), 508-527. (Published | Final Draft)

Body Representation

These papers are about how we mentally represent our own bodies. I am primarily interested in the cognitive ontology of body representations—questions such as: how many body representations are there, how are they related, and what are their functional properties? To answer these questions, I draw on evidence of body representation distortion in eating disorders and other conditions, and apply models of body representation to understand that distortion. The empirical side of the project focuses on improving experimental paradigms used to study body representation, such as body size estimation tasks.

  • Gadsby, S., & Engel, M. (2025) Allowed response time and estimated average body size influence visual body size estimates. Acta Psychologica. 253, 104730. (Open Access)

  • Gadsby, S., & Hohwy, J. (2022). Predictive processing and body representation. The Routledge Handbook of Bodily Awareness, eds. A. Alsmith & M. Longo. Routledge. (Final Draft)

  • Gadsby, S. (2019). Body representations and cognitive ontology: Drawing the boundaries of the body image. Consciousness and Cognition, 74, 102772. (Published | Final Draft)

  • Gadsby, S., & Williams, D. (2018). Action, affordances, and anorexia: body representation and basic cognition. Synthese, 195(12), 5297–5317. (Published | Final Draft)

  • Gadsby, S. (2018). How are the spatial characteristics of the body represented? A reply to Pitron & de Vignemont. Consciousness and Cognition, 62, 183-168. (Published | Final Draft)

  • Gadsby, S. (2017). Distorted body representations in anorexia nervosa. Consciousness and Cognition, 51, 17-33. (Published | Final Draft)